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-=Dexter=- [ Konsul ]
Forum CM: Publikacje o stanie wojennym
Przeczytałbym coś ciekawego na temat wprowadzenia stanu wojennego, ineteresują mnie wszelkie publikacje - zwolenników i przeciwników - opinie skrajne jak najmilej widziane ;)
Pytam na forum a nie szukam sam bo liczę na krótką recenzję do każdej pozycji.
A może wyszło coś za granicą na ten temat? Może być po angielsku i rosyjsku.
sturm [ Australopitek ]
Znalazlem krotki opis pewnej ksiazki i chyba moze byc ciekawa:)
U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-1981; MacEachin, Douglas J.
U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-1981 is written by Douglas J. MacEachin, a thirty-year veteran of the CIA who rose to the position of deputy director of intelligence. He occupied this position during the Polish crisis, overseeing the office that ran the CIA Operations Center (209). His unique position within the CIA enabled MacEachin to present a rare insight on how intelligence influences policymaking nationally. Additionally, MacEachin's close association with former director of the CIA Robert Gates added immensely to his analysis.
The book is a study of the intelligence process at the national command level as it primarily involves current intelligence. The sources included the President's Daily Brief (PDB), the National Intelligence Daily (NID), the Alert Memorandum to the President and other cabinet-level officials, and National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) as appropriate to the crisis. The study addresses several questions involved in the process, including, Was there a disconnect between event outcomes and intelligence direction? MacEachin asks, "What was it in the intelligence and policy process that permitted such disconnection? What allowed the officials to be caught off guard? Was it the information itself or was it what was done with the information? What could have been done differently that would have produced a different result? [and] What practices can be established to help avoid similar misses in the future?" (3-4). The purpose of the book, therefore, has two components: first, "to present a detailed examination of what was known by U.S. intelligence agencies at the time the events in Poland were unfolding, how it was reported, and what analytic judgements were provided to U.S. policy officials" (4), and second, to contribute to the "historical perspectives by juxtaposing what was known and described at the time from U.S. intelligence sources with what is portrayed in the records and descriptions of those who directed the events" (5).
Chapters 1-5 deal with what MacEachin refers to as the "first peak" of the crises. This involves a historical description of the rise of Solidarity, beginning a year before the internal crackdown (July-December 1980) and the threat of Soviet intervention. Chapters 6-9 concern the events that constitute the brink of Soviet military intervention and the less-intense U.S. public offensive (January-April 1981). The final phase, presented in chapters 10-14, referred to as "[m]arching to the end game" (152), depicts the Polish regime's martial law crackdown (December 1981). However, in the last section, offered almost as an addendum (chapters 13-14), MacEachin deals with the core of the book, which is the U.S. command authority's being "caught off guard" and whether it made a difference. In these last chapters, MacEachin attempts to answer what happened and why. He expresses his judgment by saying, "[W]hile there is enough blame to go around, it begins with the failure to effectively employ the intelligence information" (244).
The book is an excellent analysis of the current intelligence process at work at the national level. It will be of most value to professional scholars of the intelligence process, graduate students in a seminar environment, and intelligence community professionals.