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joozzeekk [ Pretorianin ]
Forum CM: Kompania grenadierów pancernych
Mając do dyspozycji w pełni zmechanizowaną kompanię grenadierów pancernych w jaki sposób wykorzystujecie jej organiczne Sdkfz w manewrze nawiązania kontaktu z nplem, ataku (na doraźną i przygotowaną obronę) oraz w obronie?
Kłosiu [ Senator ]
jozek --> w grach ligowych nie zdarza sie pelna kompania zmechanizowana. Jest za droga, i nie miesci sie w limitach CA. Zdarza sie czasem pluton zmechanizowany i da sie go wykorzystac co najmniej na dwa sposoby w ME (mowie o BB i AK).
1. Szybkie podjechanie do flagi i zajecie jej, w tym przypadku biore oprocz plt grenadierow 3 schrecki do samoobrony i jeden hmg42 jako wsparcie. Piechote wyladowujesz w poblizu celu za zaslona, szybko zajmuje cel, a SPW daja wsparcie w obronie swoimi MG.
2. W koncowej fazie bitwy, gdy srodki ppanc npla sa zniszczone mozna plutonu uzyc do szybkiego okrazenia obrony wroga, wysadzenia piechoty na tylach i zaatakowaniu od tylu pozycji. W koncu bitwy swiezy pluton z tylu + 4 MG z SPW czesto przewazaja szale. Wady: musisz rozbic sprzet ppanc npla, no i przez wiekszosc bitwy te 350 pkt sa nieuzywane w ogole.
Piechota na SPW to formacja ofensywna, imho w obronie wysoce nieprzydatna ;) Lepiej tu kupic za te cene zwykla kompanie piechoty, bo obronca jest malo ruchliwy, a jezeli sie rusza, to wykorzystujac raczej lasy, wiec nie ma co wystawiac SPW na ostrzal npla.
W BO piechota zmechanizowana w ogole sie nie przydaje.
Pejotl [ Senator ]
Mnie tam zawsze korci zeby w obronie wziac cos szybkiego i wyjechac do przodu tak, zeby zorganizowac zasadzke w miejscu, w którym przeciwnik sie nie spodziewa. Tak dorwac jego piechotę idącą MOVE-m po otwartym terenie... Ale raczej nie bylyby to regularne jednostki tylko kombinowane najtansze transportery i dokupione ckmy, ktore mialyby przeciwnikowi odebrac troche cennych tur czasu.
Kłosiu [ Senator ]
Pejotl --> mapy w obronie maja za malo przestrzeni miedzy obronca a atakujacym na takie wygibasy ;) Owszem, cos takiego da sie zrobic, ale lepiej uzyc piechoty bez pojazdow, zeby sie nie dekonspirowac. Rzadko zdarza sie mapa, gdzie mozna niezauwazenie podjechac do przodu pojazdami.
joozzeekk [ Pretorianin ]
W grach ligowych tak zapewne jest. Ja chciałem rozpocząć akademicką dyskusję na temat przydatności SPW w różnych sytuacjach taktycznych. Jaka właściwie była koncepcja ich użycia? Regulował to jakiś regulamin? Czy spełniały taką funkcję jak dziś m.in. M113 tzw "battle taxi" czy były też pojazdami wsparcia? (Pomijam tu te rozbudowane wersje) Moim zdaniem największym ich plusem jest szybkość a wadą duża wrażliwość na ostrzał. Na pewno zdarzało wam się grać np operację przeciw AI. W jaki sposób wówczas przeprowadzaliście marsz taką kompanią?
Pejotl [ Senator ]
Kłosiu -> ale to niekoniecznie musi być "niezauważenie". Gracz w ataku jest psychicznie nieprzygotowany do radzenia sobie z takim atakiem - wystarczy trochę pojeździć za drzewami żeby zmusić atakującego do kombinowania - niech poplącze sobie szyki. Chodzi o to żeby zyskać czas... no ale ty grasz na 60 tur - to pewnie nie mialoby wtedy zadnego znaczenia :)
Kłosiu [ Senator ]
Dla anglojezycznych moge wkleic maly wstep do taktyki formacji zmechanizowanych ;)
The Panzergrenadier Attacks
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The tactics employed by the Panzer Divisions were well thought out, and efficiently executed under the best of circumstances - good preparation, the element of surprise, and sufficient armoured infantry in SPWs to exploit the gains won by the tanks. More importantly, for much of the war these tactics were sufficiently flexible and effective that they usually worked under less-than-ideal conditions, and occasionally succeeded under appalling circumstances. Where they failed the cause was usually massive enemy opposition especially coordinated air cover - which caused such heavy attrition in men and material that the Panzer Divisions no longer had sufficient forces to carry out their assigned tasks.
Since the SPWs were to operate as close to the tanks as possible, the basic tactics for the tanks will necessarily be involved in a discussion of the employment of the SdKfz 251. Under the ideal conditions above, the personnel carriers were part of a combined force which in many ways was more than the sum of its parts.
The basic tactical objective of a Panzer or Panzergrenadier Division was to concentrate at a weak point in the enemy's lines a sufficient number of aggressively employed tanks and support troops to break through the enemy front, to spread out to encircle strongpoints and troop concentrations, and to hold open a corridor through which additional armoured and support units could move to expand the breakthrough and repeat the process in the enemy's rear support positions and at other points in the front lines.
The initial operation in an offensive was battlefield reconnaissance. The Panzer Aufklarungs Abteilung (armoured reconnaissance battalion) was responsible for local reconnaissance for a Panzer or Panzergrenadier Division. Using armoured cars, half-tracks, and other vehicles, the reconnaissance detachments probed enemy positions or observed enemy forces. They were also responsible for locating suitable terrain features for the armoured advance, and the placement of artillery and anti-tank guns; and for locating fording areas across streams or suitable positions for building bridges or launching assault boats during an attack.
The use of combined arms in the assault was critical to German tactics. As early as the Polish campaign, the Germans learned that direct tank assaults against effective anti-tank defences resulted in heavy losses. Later events demonstrated that even large formations of tanks could not achieve a breakthrough when opposed by anti-tank guns unless assisted by Assault Artillery and Panzergrenadiers. Thus, the mobility and armour protection for the Panzergrenadiers was improved as much as possible to allow the infantry to operate up with the armour during an attack.
There were several types of attacks: flank attack, frontal attack, envelopment (combination flank and frontal assaults), wing (against the ends of the enemy's main frontal positions) and encirclement, in which the main
attacking force bypasses the enemy positions on a flank, then sweeps around from the rear to manoeuvre the enemy from his prepared positions and disrupt his defences. However, within variables caused by terrain, deployment of the enemy, and resources available for the assault, all these attack plans used very similar tank/infantry tactics. Tanks were intended to break through the front line positions and attack the enemy artillery and command positions. The infantry was to assist the tanks and, in particular, to destroy enemy anti-tank weapons. Enemy tanks were countered by German anti-tank guns, usually self-propelled in the front units of the assault.
An assault was spearheaded by a Panzer regiment (or battalion, in the case of a Panzergrenadier division). Earlier in the war, the standard form of the attack was composed of three waves; though there were variations, the basic tactic was consistent. The first wave was composed of tanks as the forward line of movement. One commonly used formation was the 'blunt wedge'. In this advance, two tank companies of a battalion were lined up abreast; each company was spread to cover about 450 to 500 metres of front line, with about 200 to 300 metres between them. Battalion headquarters was about 500 metres behind the lead tanks, and the third and fourth companies, as reserves, trailed in file (or double file) behind battalion HQ the rearmost tanks about 900 to 1000 metres behind the HQ troops. The lead tank companies advanced to the enemy lines and broke through to the artillery and anti-tank defence positions. If resistance developed, the leading companies bypassed it, or the battalion commander could reinforce the tanks with his remaining companies. The tanks advanced in steps, using terrain as cover whenever possible. The rear echelons provided fire support for the advance elements. When the leading tanks had advanced to good firing positions, they laid down fire to support the following vehicles as they advanced to the forward positions. This 'leapfrogging' was the standard tactic for tank advance for most of the war.
The second wave provided fire support for the first wave, and consisted of tank units from the first and/or second tank battalions accompanied by a few companies of Panzergrenadiers in SdKfz 251s. The second wave attacked the remaining anti-tank positions, the heavy infantry support weapons, and enemy machine guns which would slow the following infantry advance.
The third wave, consisting of the remainder of the tanks in the second tank battalion and the rest of the Panzergrenadiers, consolidated the gains won by the first waves, mopped up pockets of resistance bypassed in the assault, and provided a reserve for the lead elements as the assault progressed. Most of the Panzergrenadiers in this third wave were motorized infantry in trucks a's the armoured infantry was used in the first and second waves.
During the actual advance the SPWs of the Panzergrenadier companies stayed from 100 to 150 metres behind the tanks. The SPWs provided fire support directed against enemy forward anti-tank weapons or tank-killer infantry and also advised the armour of additional targets for the tanks' heavier guns. In the flank areas, assault guns or self-propelled anti-tank guns provided support and protection for the tanks. SPWs also accompanied the assault guns when necessary, to provide protection against tank-killer teams or concealed anti-tank weapons.
The actual tactics of the Panzergrenadiers depended on the terrain and objectives. Open terrain was crossed as quickly as possible, using artillery to lay HE shells and/or smoke to provide cover and fire support. When possible, the Panzergrenadiers stayed in the vehicles until they were close enough to the enemy to dismount and attack as infantry. The SPWs provided fire support with the vehicle machine guns. In terrain with more cover, platoons of SPWs would advance in stages from one covered position to another, with the leading and following elements providing fire support for each other. Any natural features such as woods or stream beds were used. for cover, and every attempt was made to avoid crossing open terrain under direct fire.
In cases where strong anti-tank defences existed or where there were extensive anti-tank obstacles, the Panzergrenadiers led the assault ahead of the tanks. Although the SdKfz 251 was very vulnerable to anti-tank weapons, in many cases enemy gunners waited as long as possible before firing, since they would thus expose their positions. The tanks remained a few hundred metres behind the SPWs and fired on any enemy positions that were spotted.
In situations where rapid advances could be made with good cover, the Panzergrenadiers could clear enemy anti-tank positions with relatively low losses. Across open terrain the tanks and SPWs were more exposed, and often the tanks had to move closer (100 to 200 metres) behind the half-tracks to provide more effective support. Though infantry losses were higher in attacking enemy positions ahead of the tanks, this tactic was essential to allow German armour to manoeuvre freely during the penetration and breakthrough phases of the assault.
After the enemy anti-tank troops had been neutralized, the tanks and Panzergrenadiers advanced together in one assault wave. The infantry rode in the SPWs as far as possible, and dismounted to destroy individual pockets of resistance. The Panzergrenadiers' heavy support weapons - mortars and light artillery pieces - were brought up to fire on any newly discovered enemy anti-tank weapons or artillery. At this point in the assault the primary mission of the Panzergrenadiers was to eliminate enemy positions that had survived the first assault wave, and to protect the rear of the armoured formation.
To stary artykul z The Bunker - nieistniejacej juz strony o CM.
Kłosiu [ Senator ]
Jak z tego widac, SPW z grenadierami wchodzily w przestrzen oczyszczona z broni ppanc przez nacierajace w pierwszym rzucie czolgi, i mialy za zadanie wymiesc wszelkie pozostale z rozbitej linii ogniska oporu. Czyli dzialaly tylko przeciw oslabionemu (czy wrecz rozbitemu) przeciwnikowi.
Ebert [ Centurion ]
A propos grenadierów... w Empiku jest książka pt.: "Taktyka grenadierów pancernych" czy jakoś tak. Dosyć szczegółowo opisują jaką stosowali taktykę, jaki sprzęt, historia. Druga z serii książek opisuje taktykę amerykańskiej piechoty morskiej. Dobrze mieć, ciekawa lektura.
mgk [ Generał - Pacyfista ]
W grach ligowych piechota zmechanizowana ma dosyc dobre właściwości jezeli chodzi o proprcje siły ognia do ceny a ponadto w pozniejszych latach maja pancerfausty co troche pomaga im bronic zdobytych przyczółków. a na halftracki zamiast piechoty mozna zaladowac dziala ;-)
jp2 [ Generaďż˝ ]
prawdziwa przydatnosć transoporterów opanc (a takze ciężarówek - wogóle nie nieużywanych w grach ligowych) pojawia się przy olbrzymich mapach.
takich "huge" 3000-5000+ lub jak kto woli 3km x 3km.
traun [ Pretorianin ]
Ostatnio piechota zmech miło mnie zaskoczyła w grach spotkaniowych jest bardzo dobra bo pozwala szybko obsadzić okolice flag (pod warunkiem że jej raid będzie osłaniany przed pancernymi zagonami napla) a chroni przed lekkim ogmiem równocześnie ogień z halfraków skutechnie przydusza piechotę przeciwnika. Do stosowania w walkach bez dużej ilości piechoty za to z przewagą wojs pancernych....
BamSey [ Generaďż˝ ]
jp2----> "a takze ciężarówek - wogóle nie nieużywanych w grach ligowych)" Heh jak to nie uzywanych ja mam zawsze kilka:))
Remifr [ Pretorianin ]
BamSey---> i dopiero teraz to mówisz !!!!! ;)
BamSey [ Generaďż˝ ]
Remfir----> A jak inaczej tak szybko pod flagą bym był;)))
Remifr [ Pretorianin ]
BamSey---> wiem o tym, że wykozystałes ciężarówki, ale chodziło mi o to, dlaczego wcześniej o tym nei wiedziałem tzn. przed rozpoczęciem bitwy !!!!??!!! ;)